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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
RONALD DEAN LANCASTERf 
PIaintiff-Respondent. 
vs. 
GERALD COOK, Utah State 
Prison, 
Defendant-Appellant. 
Case No. 870431 
Priority 3 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS 
This is a petition for rehearing under Rule 35, Utah R« 
Sup. Ct. (1985) . 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUE 
1. Did this Court midconstrue or overlook relevant 
statutory and case authority when it held that a habeas corpus 
petitioner need not pursue a § 77-13-6 motion to withdraw his 
guilty plea in the criminal trial court and a direct appeal 
before he is entitled to a collateral relief? 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Plaintiff filed a pro se petition for post-conviction 
relief under Rule 65B(i), Utah R. Civ. P. in the Third District 
Court before the Honorable Scott Daniels. Judge Daniels 
dismissed the petition on the motion of respondent Cook (R. 45)• 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
According to the petition petitioner filed in distric 
court/ he is currently confined at the Utah State Prison for a 
conviction of second degree murder after the entry of a plea of 
guilty (R. 35). Petitioner's central claim was that his guilty 
plea was involuntarily entered* 
Respondents filed a motion to dismiss the petition, 
arguing that petitioner's claims for relief were not properly 
before the court becase he had not filed a motion to withdraw h 
guilty plea under Utah Code Ann. § 77-13-6 (1982). The court 
granted that motion without a hearing (R. 45). 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
A habeas corpus, post-conviction petitioner should be 
precluded from pursuing that attack where he failed to pursue a 
77-13-6 motion in the criminal case that would have allowed him 
to perfect a direct appeal. This Court has long barred 
collateral attacks where the petitioner failed to raise 
appealable issues in a direct appeal. Such an approach is 
consonant with this Court's policy of allowing the original tri 
court to correct any errors in its own proceedings and would be 
more expeditious remedy for the person attacking his or her 
guilty plea. 
ENTRQPtfCTIQN 
In Brown v. Pickard, denying reh"g, 4 Utah 292, 11 P. 
512 (1886), this Court set forth the standard for determining 
whether a petition for rehearing should be granted: 
To justify a rehearing, a strong case must be 
made. We must be convinced that the court 
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failed to consider some material point in the 
case, or that it erred in its conclusions, or 
that some matter has been discovered which 
was unknown at the time of the hearing, 
4 Utah at 294, 11 P. at 512 (citation omitted). In Qummings. v. 
Nielson, 42 Utah 157, 129 P. 619 (1913), the Court stated: 
To make an application for a rehearing is a 
matter of right, and we have no desire to 
discourage the practice of filing petitions 
for rehearings in proper cases. When this 
court, however, has considered and decided 
all of the material questions involved in a 
case, a rehearing should not be applied for, 
unless we have misconstrued or overlooked 
some material fact or facts, or have 
overlooked some statute or decision which may 
affect the result, or that we have based the 
decision on some wrong principle of law, or 
have either misapplied or overlooked 
something which materially affects the result 
• • . . If there are some reasons, however, 
such as we have indicated above, or other 
good reasons, a petition for a rehearing 
should be promptly filed and, if it is 
meritorious, its form will in no case be 
scrutinized by this court. 
42 Utah at 172-73, 129 P. at 624. The argument portion of this 
brief will demonstrate that, based on these standards, the 
State's petition for rehearing is properly before the Court and 
should be granted. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
BYPASS OF A S 77-13-6 MOTION AND A DIRECT 
APPEAL FROM THAT MOTION SHOULD PRECLUDE 
COLLATERAL REVIEW. 
In Lancaster v. Cook. P.2d , No. 870431 (Utah 
filed April 7, 1988) (attached as Appendix A), this Court held 
that a habeas corpus petitioner under Rule 65B(i), Utah R. Civ. 
P., is not required to first attack his guilty plea by moving to 
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withdraw it under Utah Code Ann, S 77-13-6 (1982) in the trial 
court prior to pursuing a collateral attack. With all due 
respect to the Court, that holding misconstrues and overlooks 
relevant statutory and case authority. 
State v. Gibbons, 740 P.2d 1309 (Utah 1987) , requires a 
criminal appellant to first pursue in the tiral court a motion to 
withdraw his guilty plea before he may appeal the validity of 
that plea to this Court. In so holding, the Court noted that S 
77-13-6 does not contain any time limit for filing a motion to 
withdraw the plea. i£[. at 1311. Theoretically then, Lancaster 
could file a motion to withdraw his plea even "some nine years 
after the time for a direct appeal hals] run." Lancaster # slip 
op. at 2. The question then, is whether, as a policy matter and 
under applicable habeas corpus standards, Lancaster should be 
allowed to select to bypass review in the trial court and a 
subsequent direct appeal and proceed instead under Rule 65B(i). 
The State urges this Court to reconsider its ruling in Lancaster 
and find that failure to proceed under § 77-13-6 precludes a 
collateral attack. 
As thie Court notes, it has repeatedly held that 
failure to take a direct apeal precludes review on collateral 
attack except in unusual circumstances. Porter v. Cook. 747 P.2d 
1031, 1032 (Utah 1987); Codianna v. Morris. 660 P.2d 1101, 1104 
(Utah 1983); Andrews v. Morris. 607 P.2d 816 (Utah 1980); 
Martinez v> Smith* 602 p.2d 700, 702 (Utah 1979); Raaunell Vt 
SmJJLllf 560 P.2d 1108 (Utah 1 9 7 7 ) ; Brown v . Turner , 21 Utah 2d 9 6 , 
440 P.2d 968 ( 1 9 6 8 ) . 
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Those circumstances include: when the trial court had 
no jurisdiction over the person or the offense, where the 
requirements of law have been so disregarded that the party is 
substantially and effectively denied due process of law, or where 
some such fact is shown that it would be wholly unconscionable 
not to reexaine the conviction. Brown v. Turner, 21 Utah 2d at 
98-99, 440 P.2d at 969. The court further stated: 
If the contention of error is something which 
is known or should be known to the party at 
the time the judgment was entered, it must be 
reviewed in the manner and within the time 
permitted by regular prescribed procedure, or 
the judgment becomes final and is not subject 
to further attack, except in some unusual 
circumstance . . . . Were it otherwise, the 
regular rules of procedure governing appeals 
and the limitations of time specified therein 
would be rendered impotent. 
id., at 969. In this case, none of the reasons Lancaster cites as 
the basis of his petition rise to the unusual circumstances that 
this Court contemplated would be sufficient to preclude the 
habeas court from invoking the waiver rule. Moreover, Lancaster 
not only bypassed his direct appeal but failed to file in the 
trial court the necessary motion that would have perfected that 
appeal. Certainly, it seems apparent that this Court would 
affirm a decision of a habeas court to dismiss a collateral 
attack under fi££MH and its progeny where the petitioner had 
failed to directly appeal the criminal trial court's denial of a 
S 77-13-6 motion to withdraw his plea. For that reason, it is 
only logical to preclude habeas corpus review, absent the 
requisite unusual circumstances, where the complainant fails to 
take the initial step in the chain. 
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As a policy matter, this Court stated in Gibbons that 
the requirement of filing under § 77-13-6 prior to appealing a 
guilty plea Mis also consonant with the policy of allowing trial 
judges to have the opportunity to address an alleged error," Jj&. 
at 1312, citing State v. Lesley. 672 P.2d 79, 82 (Utah 1983). It 
is also a sound policy to bar Rule 65B(i) review, except in 
unusual circumstances, unless the petitioner has first approached 
the trial court for the relief sought. 
This Court also noted that requiring trial courts to 
carefully adhere to Rule 11(e) regarding guilty pleas would "tend 
to discourage, or at least facilitate swift disposition of, post-
conviction attacks on the validity of guilty pleas because the 
trial judge will have produced a clearly adequate record for 
review." Gibbons, 740 P.2d at 1314. Similarly, requiring 
inmates to pursue their trial court remedy under § 77-13-6 will 
also tend to discourage, or facilitate quick disposition, of such 
collateral attacks. 
Each time a petitioner under Rule 65B(i) files in the 
Third District Court an attack on a guilty plea that court, which 
usually knows nothing about the case, must obtain and review the 
record established in the criminal trial court. This procedure 
can be slow and inefficient where the records must be prepared 
and transmitted to the defendant's attorney, reviewed tor an 
appropriate response to the complaint, and then transmitted to 
the habeas court. A much less cumbersome and more expeditious 
method of review would take place under S 77-13-6 in the court 
that took the plea. And, again, would give that court an 
opportunity to correct its own errors, if any. 
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Lancaster also applies the distinction between habeas 
corpus collateral attack and direct appeal in a superficial 
manner. Slip op. at 1-2. While it is true that these two 
processes are distinct, the fact that Gibbons did not involve a 
collateral attack does not preclude its rationale from being 
applied in the habeas corpus forum. As discussed above, it is 
the fact that Lancaster used collateral attack to circumvent a 
required criminal appellate route that is crucial. Perhaps the 
order of the lower court which was prepared by respondent's 
attorney is lacking in analysis that explains how the principle 
applied, but its ultimate conclusion was, nevertheless, correct. 
Collateral attack is not a substitute for direct appeal and 
failing to take a step that would perfect such an appeal (a § 77-
13-6 motion) should bar the use of collateral attack in most 
instances. In fact, most, if not all, of the judges in the Third 
District Court have relied on Gibbons and required petitioners on 
collateral attack to first apply to the trial court for relief. 
See Appendix B.* 
Finally, the Court appears to chastize both counsel for 
Warden Cook and the lower court for meeting Lancaster's challenge 
to his guilty plea with a response directed at a procedural 
defect rather than the merits of his claims. E.g. slip op. at 2-
3. This Court has itself applied, in many instances, procedural 
bars to habeas corpus relief. E.g. Porter. 747 P.2d at 1032; 
Appendix B contains copies of orders entered by Third District 
judges dismissing petitions on this rationale. These by no means 
include all of the cases in which the lower court has so ruled 
but represent a small sample of those cases. 
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Cgtiiannar 660 P.2d at 1104; Andrews, 607 P.2d at 816; Martinez/ 
602 P.2d at 702; Rammell: 560 P.2d at 1108; BjJQMRt 21 Utah 2d at 
96, 440 P.2d at 968. Thus, the approach of the court and counsel 
was not without historical basis. 
As part of this admonishment, the opinion complains 
that the lower court did not make findings of fact on the merits 
of Lancaster's claims when the court dismissed the case, without 
an evidentiary hearing on the merits, on a question of law. Such 
a requirement in Rule 65B(i) cases would be novel if not an 
insurmountable burden. The very purpose for a motion to dismiss 
under Rule 12(b) prior to a hearing on the merits of a case is to 
avoid consideration of the merits. See Siek v. Siekr 93 N.Y.S.2d 
470, 472, aff'd. 276 A.D. 1035, 95 N.Y.S.2d 234 (N.Y. App. Div. 
1950). The motion presumes that the facts alleged in the 
complaint are true but argues tnat, in spite of the facts, the 
complainant is not entitled to relief based upon the law. See 
Romero v. U.S. Life Ins. Co. of Dallas, 719 P.2d 819, 820 (N.M. 
App. 1986). 
Becuse Judge Daniels dismissed this case based upon the 
law, he did not consider the merits of Lancaster's claims. 
Remand for "entry of findings on the merits", is, therefore, not 
an appropriate order. The case must be remanded for a hearing on 
the merits before findings can be entered if this Court 
determines that Lancaster is not required to first proceed under 
S 77-13-6 in the criminal trial court. 
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PER CURIAM: 
.-lainti ff filed, in propria persona, a petition for 
postconviction relief in the trial court with respect to his 
guilty plea to and subsequent conviction of second degree 
rurdfr. The trial court dismissed the petition as inappro-
priate, as plaintiff had not brought a motion to withdraw his 
guilty plea and a collateral attack under rule 65B of the Utah 
P'.*" r-? of Civil Procedure was therefore not permissible. We 
textile and remand for entry of findings on the merits, 
In response to plaintiff's petition, the State brought 
a m' "?n to dismiss on the ground that under the rationale of 
Stat* v. Gibbons, 740 P.2d 1309 (Utah 1987), plaintiff was 
prerjuoed from bringing a motion for post-conviction relief 
u n M l he had first brought a motion to set aside his guilty 
I" * . The trial court adopted that rationale in its order 
'^ y/ g writ of habeas cor pus, and the St at e repeats it before 
tij ' s Court in chall enging t he n e i J ts of f >3 aint if f 's habeas 
co. pus petition. 
State v> Gibbons is inapposite here. Gibbons pleaded 
c n H v y to several charges and then appealed directly after the 
it if] court had sentenced him to consecutive terms of iwprison-
>'*, t He dirt i of file* a motion to withdraw M B guilty plea • 
before perfecting his appeal, and the State argued that this 
Court should decline to consider the guilty plea issue because 
it was not raised below, 740 P.2d at 1311. This Court declined 
to follow the State's request and remanded the case to enable 
Gibbons to file a motion to withdraw his guilty plea, retaining 
jurisdiction over the case for further action. State v. Gibbons 
did not represent a collateral attack on the guilty plea. 
Conversely here, plaintiff filed a post-conviction 
petition to challenge the validity of his guilty plea some nine 
years after the time for a direct appeal had run. It appears 
from his handwritten pleadings that he was originally charged 
with first degree murder, but pleaded to second degree murder 
when the prosecution was unable to prove the aggravating cir-
cumstances with which he had been charged. In his habeas corpus 
petition, plaintiff appears to allege that he thought he had 
pleaded to "unintentional murder" and that he should have been 
sentenced to one to fifteen years' imprisonment instead of five 
years to life. Plaintiff stated that he was innocent of know-
ingly and intentionally committing the offense and was therefore 
unlawfully imprisoned and that he had been denied due process 
and effective assistance of counsel. In addition, plaintiff 
challenged the constitutionality of the statutes under which 
he was charged and sentenced. 
This Court has repeatedly stated that habeas corpus is 
not a substitute for and cannot be used to perform the function 
of regular appellate review. Porter v. Cook, 747 P.2d 1031, 
1032 (Utah 1987); Codianna v. Morris, 660 P.2d 1101, 1104 (Utah 
1983); Martinez v. Smith, 602 P.2d 700, 702 (Utah 1979). But 
it has also recognized that review by habeas corpus is appro-
priate in unusual circumstances to assure fundamental fairness 
and to reexamine a conviction when the nature of the alleged 
error is such that it would be unconscionable not to reexamine. 
Codianna, 660 P.2d at 1115 (Stewart, J.# concurring in result). 
Moreover, rule 65B(i) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 
specifically provides that a prisoner who asserts a substantial 
denial of his constitutional rights "may institute a proceeding 
under this rule." See also Martinez v. Smith, supra, where 
this Court held a petition for habeas corpus reviewable without 
first requiring the withdrawal of a guilty plea. Given the 
allegations plaintiff made in his petition, it was therefore 
error for the trial court to dismiss the petition without 
granting a hearing. 
Without the benefit of findings, this Court is in no 
position to review the validity of plaintiff's claims. It is 
tafe to assume that trial courts prefer to give short shrift to 
the many post-conviction petitions which they decide lack merit. 
Jt is equally safe to assume that an appellate court will be 
\: irble to review the case in a vacuum and will have to remand 
it where no rationale for dismissal or denial is given. A 
No. 870431 2 
8 i m p 1 e f i n d i n g, o i :  t h e o t h e r h a n d
 f w i 1 1 s u £ f" i c e i i , I: 1 , e \ a s t 
'majority of cases to limit the judicial process to oi ie i eviev 
The trial court's basis for dismissing plaintiff's petition in 
this case was erroneousf as stated. The record is too sparse * 
fc r this Court to determine whether the issues raised by the 
pleadings were legal, so that it could affirm the trial court 
on the ground that the claims were properly resolved as a 
Batter of law. See Gonzales v, Morris, 610 P.2d 1285, 1286 
(Utah 1980). InsteadT^Tt appears that plaintiff claims irreg-
ularity in the reception of his guilty plea, a- ^ssue that 
should havf : • •-• considered r*v the trial court 
merits. 
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Case No. C87-4336 
Judge Richard Moffat 
On J u l y 3 1 , 1987 , t h i s matter came be fore the Court on 
r e s p o n d e n t s motion t o d i s m i s s . The p e t i t i o n e r appeared pro s e ; 
Kimberly K. Hornak, A s s i s t a n t Attorney G e n e r a l , appeared in 
b e h a l f of r e s p o n d e n t . 
Baving heard and c o n s i d e r e d the arguments of the 
p a r t i e s , the Court g r a n t s r e s p o n d e n t ' s motion t o d i s m i s s on the 
ground t h a t p e t i t i o n e r ' s r e q u e s t for p o s t c o n v i c t i o n review under 
Utah R. C i v . P . 65B( i ) of the v a l i d i t y of h i s g u i l t y p l e a i s not 
p r o p e r l y b e f o r e t h e Court , in t h a t p e t i t i o n e r has not presented a 
• o t i o n t o withdraw h i s p l e a under Utah Code Ann. S 7 7 - 1 3 - 6 (1982) 
to the t r i a l c o u r t in which i t was e n t e r e d . &££. fftate v . 
Gibbons. 60 Utah Adv. Rep. 36 , 37 , P.2d , (Utah 
1 9 8 7 ) . 
DATED t h i s day of August, 1987. 
JUDGE RICHARD MOFFAT 
MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I hereby c e r t i f y t h a t a t r u e and accu ra t e copy of t h e 
foregoing Order was n a i l e d , pos tage p r e p a i d , to J e r r y Lee 
V e l a r d e , P e t i t i o n e r Pro Se, P.O. Box 250, Draper , Utah 84020, 
t h i s '0 ^ d a y of August, 1987. 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
ROBERT S. TREFF, : RULING ON RESPONDENT'S 
MOTION TO DISMISS 
Petitioner, : 
CIVIL NO. C-88-482 
vs. : 
STATE OF UTAH, : 
Respondent. : 
The petitioner herein, Robert S. Treff, filed a "Writ of 
Habeas Corpus and Motion to Rescind Plea Bargain" on December 31, 
1987 in the Fourth Judicial District Court. The said pleading 
essentially claims that petitioner was persuaded to plead guilty 
by promises later broken, and that the prosecution had evidence 
that could have helped the defendant prior to the defendant 
making his plea, and that he would not have made a guilty plea 
had he known of the same. 
On January 19, 19e8, the Fourth District Court acknowledged 
receipt of the Writ of Habeas Corpus or Motion to Rescind the 
Plea, and stated that a transcript of the proceedings would be 
filed by the Deputy County Attorney, and the matter brought to 
the Court's attention when ready. 
On January 25, 1988, the Fourth District Coyrt transferred 
the said matter to the Third District Court in and for Salt Lake 
County, inasmuch as petitioner was confined in the Utah State 
TREFF V. STATE PAGE TWO RULING ON MOTION 
Prison. A copy of such Order was served upon the petitioner, his 
court appointed attorney Michael Esplin, the Utah County 
Attorney, and the Utah Attorney General. 
The Attorney General filed a Motion to Dismiss the Petition, 
its Memorandum of Points and Authorities in support of its said 
Motion to Dismiss, and a request that a decision be made on the 
said Motion without further hearing. Such documents were mailed 
to petitioner on February 9, 1988, and subsequently to 
petitioner's attorney, Michael B. Esplin, on February 11, 1988. 
There has been no response to the State's Motion to Dismiss 
or its Memorandum of Points and Authorities. The Court now rules 
on the said Motion as follows. 
The respondent's Motion to Dismiss the Petition for Post-
Conviction Relief is based upon the argument that the relief 
which petitioner seeks is governed by Utah Code Ann., Section 77-
13-6, State v. Gibbons, 740 P.2d 1309 (Utah 1987), and Peterson 
v. DeLand, an unpublished Court of Appeals decision, No. 870293-
CA, dated January 5, 1988, which was attached to respondent's 
Memorandum of Points and Authorities. This Court agrees with the 
position taken by the respondent. Petitioner really seeks to 
withdraw his guilty plea. Such a motion must be presented to the 
Court that accepted the guilty plea pursuant to Section 77-13-6, 
and the cases cited above. 
TREFF V. STATE PAGE THREE RULING ON MOTION 
Based upon the above, and the further argument set forth by 
the respondent in its Memorandum of Points and Authorities, this 
Court grants the respondent's Motion to Dismiss, and remands this 
matter back to Fourth District Court. 
Dated this S day of March, 1988. 
LEONARD H. RUSSON 
DISTRICT COURT JUDGE 
DAVID L. WILKINSON (3472) 
Attorney General 
DAVID B. THOMPSON (4159) 
Assistant Attorney General 
Attorneys for Respondent 
236 State Capitol 
Salt Lake City, Utah 64114 
Telephone: (801) 538-1021 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 






Case No. C87-8371 
Petitioner, Ronald E. Termunde, pro se, filed a 
petition for a writ of habeas corpus which claimed that he was 
entitled to relief from his incarceration at the Utah State 
Prison because, JLnlfiX AULA* the guilty plea that resulted in his 
felony conviction was involuntarily entered. 
Respondent filed a motion to dismiss petitioner's 
petition on the ground that petitioner had not filed a motion to 
withdraw his guilty plea in the court in which it was entered, 
and therefore was not properly before this Court seeking 
postconviction relief under Utah R. Civ. P. 65B(i). 
On February 5f 1988, this matter came before the Court 
for hearing on respondent's motion to dismiss. 
Having considered the arguments of the parties, the 
Court grants respondents motion. If petitioner wishes to 
withdraw his plea, he must do so pursuant to an appropriate 
pleading in the case in which the plea was entered. £££ UTAH 
CODE ANN. $ 77-13-6 (1982); State v. Gibbons, 740 P.2d 1309, 
1311-12 (Utah 1987). In that petitioner's other claims would be 
rendered moot if he were successful on a motion to withdraw his 
plea, those issues are not properly before the Court at this 
time. 
The petition is dismissed. 
DATED this day of , 1988. 
RICHARD H. MOFFAT 
District Judge 
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DAVID L. WILKINSON (3472) 
Attorney General 
SANDRA L. SJOGREN (4411) 
Assistant Attorney General 
Attorneys for Respondent 
236 State Capitol 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114 
Telephone: (533-7650) 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
ALVIN RICHINS, : 
Petitioner, : ORDER 
vs. : 
GARY DELAND, Director ot the : Civil No. C87-3793 
Utah State Prison; State of 
Utah, Dept. ot : Judge Pat Brian 
Corrections, 
Respondents. 
This matter came on for hearing of Respondent's Motion 
to Dismiss on August 7, 1987. Petitioner was present and 
represented himself. Respondent was represented by and through 
Sanara L. Sjogren, Assistant Attorney General. Having considered 
the Memoranda filed by respondent, petitioner's Objection to 
Notion to Dismiss and having heard argument from both parties, 
tbt Court is fully advised in the matter and enters the 
following: 
Q£DLE 
Under State v. Gibbons, 60 Utah Adv. Rep. 36 (June 30, 
1987), this Court lacks jurisdiction to consider the validity of 
petitioner's guilty plea and the petition, is, theretore, 
dismissed. 
DATED this day or , 1987. 
BY THE COURT: 
HONORABLE PAT BRIAN 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
WILLIAM E. RICHARDSON, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 




NOV 0 * 1987 
OFFICE OF 
ATTORNEY GENERAL 
Plaintiff's essential claim is that his guilty plea was 
involuntarily entered. It appears that he has not filed a Motion 
to Withdraw his Guilty Plea. His proper remedy is to file such a 
Motion before Judge Tibbs, and in the event it is denied, the 
proper remedy is an appeal from that decision. 
The Petition for a Writ of Habeas Corpus is denied. 
Dated this j day of November, 1987. 
Is I £oc+ hu^i* 
SCOTT DANIELS 
DISTRICT COURT JUDGE 
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DAVID L. WILKINSON (3472) 
Attorney General 
KIMBERLY K. HORNAK (4341) 
Assistant Attorney General 
236 State Capitol 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114 
Telephone: (801) 53 3-76 51 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
BILLY D. JENKINS, 
Petitioner, 
v. 




Civil No. C-86-6711 
Judge James S. Sawaya 
The Court, having considered the petition and motion to 
dismiss, finds that the claims raised by petitioner are without 
merit. 
IT IS ORDERED AND ADJUDGED that the motion to dismiss 
be granted, and the petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus be 
dismissed without prejudice. 
DATED this day of October, 1987. 
BY THE COURT: 
Honorable James S. Sawaya 
Third District Court Judge 
I hereby certify that a true and accurate copy of the 
foregoing Order was wailed, postage prepaid,, to Billy D. Jenkins, 
P.O. Box 250, Draper, Utah 84020 th is 3 davof October, 1987. 
DAVID L. WILKINSON (3472) 
Attorney General 
KIKBERLY K. HORNAK (4341) 
Assistant Attorney General 
Attorneys for Respondent 
236 State Capitol 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114 
Telephone: (801) 533-7 651 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
BILLY D. JENKINS, : 
Petitioner, : FINDINGS OF FACT AND 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
-v- : 
Case No. C-86-6711 
GERALD COOK, Warden, Utah : Judge James S. Sawaya 
State Prison, 
Respondent. : 
The Court, having considered the petition and motion to 
dismiss now makes and enters its: 
FINDINSS_CF_£ACI 
1. The Court finds that the issues raised in the 
petition are based on the voluntariness of the guilty plea. 
2. The court finds that, pursuant to iita££_YA_SikkQDSf 
740 P.2d 1309 (Utah 1987) petitioner must move to withdraw his 
guilty plea before filing a writ of habeas corpus. 
Having made the foregoing Findings of Fact, the Court 
now nakes its: 
CDMClfU5IDBS.CE.tftH 
1. The Court concludes that petitioner must move to 
withdraw his guilty plea in the Court where it was entered 
pursuant to SJtaie^Y^Gifcbfins. 
DATED this day of October, 1987. 
BY THE COURT: 
HONORABLE JAKES S. SAWAYA 
Third District Court Judge 
CE£TIEICAIE_DE-MAIL12$C 
I hereby certify that a true and accurate copy of the 
foregoing Findings of Fact Conclusions of Law was mailed, postage 
prepaid, to Billy D. Jenkins, P.O. Box 250, Draper, Utah 84020 
this ^ . . day of October, 1987. 
kj./xi't'^iJ/u.La 
DAVID L. WILKINSON (3472) 
Attorney General 
DAVID B. THOMPSON (4159) 
Assistant Attorney General 
Attorneys for Respondent 
236 State Capitol 
Sa l t Lake Ci ty , Utah 64114 
Telephone: (533-7651) 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
MAX C. BUNT, : 
Petitioner, : ORDER 
vs. : 
GERALD COOK, Warden, Utah : C i v i l No. C87-4520 
State Prison, 
: Judge Pat B. Brian 
Respondents. 
This matter came on for hearing of Respondent's Motion 
to Dismiss on August 7, 1987. P e t i t i o n e r was present and 
represented himself . Respondent was represented by and through 
David B. Thompson, Ass i s tant Attorney General. Baving considered 
the Memoranda f i l e d by respondent, p e t i t i o n e r ' s Objection to 
Motion to Dismiss and having heard argument from both p a r t i e s , 
the Court i s f u l l y advised in the matter and enters the 
fo l lowing: 
£££££ 
Under Sta te v. Gibbons. 60 Utah Adv. Rep. 36 (June 30, 
1987), t h i s Court lacks j u r i s d i c t i o n to consider the validity of 
pet i t ioner ' s gu i l ty plea and the p e t i t i o n , i s , therefore, 
dismissed. 
DATED t h i s day of A u g u s t , 1 9 8 7 . 
BY THE COURT: 
HONORABLE PAT BRIAN 
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I hereby certify that a true and accurate copy of the 
foregoing Order was sailed, postage prepaid, to Max C. Bunt, Pro 
6e, P.O. Box 250, Draper, Utah 84020, this '(^-flay of August, 
1987. 
/*DA4S-CJL >/5. \j7%f~Vlyt?2t 
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DAVID L. WILKINSON (3472) 
Attorney General 
DAVID B. THOMPSON (4159) 
A s s i s t a n t Attorney General 
A t t o r n e y s for Respondent 
236 S t a t e C a p i t o l 
S a l t Lake C i t y , Utah 84114 
Te lephone: (801) 533-7651 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNT* 
STATE OF UTAH 
MAX C. HUNT, 




MOTION TO DISMISS PETITION 
FOR POSTCONVICTION RELIEF 
Case No. C87-4520 
Judge Pat B. Brian 
Respondent Gerald Cook moves t h i s Court t o d i s m i s s 
p e t i t i o n e r ' s p e t i t i o n pursuant to Utah R. C i v . P. 1 2 ( b ) ( 1 ) for 
lack of j u r i s d i c t i o n over the s u b j e c t m a t t e r . 
This motion i s supported by an accompanying memorandum 
of p o i n t s and a u t h o r i t i e s . 
DATED t h i s ay of J u l y f 19 87. 
DAVID L. WILKINSON 
Attorney General 
DAVID B. THOKPSON V 
Assistant Attorney General 
DAVID L. WILKINSON (3472) 
A t t o r n e y G e n e r a l 
DAVID B. THOMPSON (4159) 
A s s i s t a n t A t t o r n e y G e n e r a l 
A t t o r n e y s fo r Responden t 
236 S t a t e C a p i t o l 
S a l t Lake C i t y , Utah 84114 
T e l e p h o n e : (801) 533-7651 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
HAX C. HUNT, : MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND 
AUTHORITIES IN SUPPORT 
P e t i t i o n e r , : OF RESPONDENT'S MOTION 
TO DISMISS 
- v - : Case No. C87-4520 
GERALD COOK, : Judge P a t B . B r i a n 
R e s p o n d e n t . : 
Responden t G e r a l d Cook s u b m i t s t h e f o l l o w i n g memorandum 
of p o i n t s and a u t h o r i t i e s in s u p p o r t of h i s mot ion t o d i s m i s s . 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The f o l l o w i n g f a c t s a r e r e l e v a n t t o r e s p o n d e n t ' s mot ion 
t o d i s m i s s . 
Accord ing t o p e t i t i o n e r ^ p e t i t i o n , he i s c u r r e n t l y 
c o n f i n e d a t t h e Utah S t a t e P r i s o n fo r a c o n v i c t i o n of r o b b e r y 
a f t e r e n t e r i n g a p l e a of g u i l t y . P e t i t i o n e r has now f i l e d a 
p e t i t i o n fo r a w r i t of h a b e a s c o r p u s which in a c t u a l i t y a p p e a r s 
t o be a p e t i t i o n fo r p o s t c o n v i c t i o n r e l i e f p u r s u a n t t o Utah R. 
C i v . P . 65B( i ) (1) . 
ARGUMENT 
P e t i t i o n e r ' s p e t i t i o n r a i s e s a number of i s s u e s ; 
howeve r , h i s c e n t r a l c l a i m i s t h a t h i s g u i l t y p l e a was 
involuntarily entered. Although, at first blush, this claim 
would appear to be appropriately brought under Rule 65B(i)(l) in 
a proceeding for postconviction relief, a review of the 
applicable provision in the code of criminal procedure indicates 
that it is not. 
UTAH CODE ANN. S 77-13-6 (1982) s t a t e s : 
A plea of not gu i l t y may be withdrawn at 
any time prior to conv ic t ion . A plea of 
g u i l t y or no contes t may be withdrawn only 
upon good cause shown and with leave of 
court . 
This s tatutory provis ion governing the withdrawal of a g u i l t y 
plea—the r e l i e f p e t i t i o n e r apparently s eeks—set s no time l i m i t 
for f i l i n g a motion to withdraw the p l ea . Therefore, the proper 
procedure i s for p e t i t i o n e r f i r s t to move to withdraw h i s gu i l ty 
p lea pursuant to S 77-13-6 in the court in which i t was entered. 
&fi£ State V. GlbfrpnSr Ut. Sup. Ct. No. 860405, s l i p op. at 4 
( f i l e d June 30, 1987) (a copy of the e n t i r e opinion i s attached 
as an addendum) . For the same reasons that the Supreme Court 
required the defendant in Gibbons to f i l e a motion to withdraw in 
the t r i a l court before attacking the g u i l t y plea on appeal, t h i s 
Court should require p e t i t i o n e r to present h is c laim to the court 
in which he was convicted before seeking c o l l a t e r a l pos t -
conv ic t ion r e l i e f . Indeed, i t p e t i t i o n e r i s unsuccessful on his 
aot ion to withdraw, the appropriate avenue of review would be 
d i r e c t appeal to the Utah Supreme Court, not a Rule 6 5 B ( i ) ( l ) 
p e t i t i o n to d i s t r i c t cour t . 
In that p e t i t i o n e r ' s other claims would be rendered 
Boot if p e t i t i o n e r i s success fu l on a motion to withdraw bis 
g u i l t y p l e a , Uiey are not proper ly b e f o r e the Court a t t h i s p o i n t 
in t i m e . 
Based upon the toreyo iny aryument, the S t a t e ' s n o t i o n 
t o d i s m i s s should be g r a n t e d . 
DATED th; i s / ^ ^ - d a y of J u l y , 1 9 8 7 . 
DAVID L. WILKINSON 
Attorney General 
DAVID B. THOMPSON V 
A s s i s t a n t Attorney General 
CERTIFICATE QT HAJUM 
I hereby c e r t i f y t h a t a true and accurate copy of the 
f o r e y o m y Motion t o D i s m i s s and Memorandum in Support of Motion 
to D i s m i s s was m a i l e d , p o s t a g e p r e p a i d , t o Max C. Hunt, P.O. Box 
i i s 2 5 0 , Draper , Utah 84020 . DATES th; lay of J u l y , 1987 
^ ^ t Z \B • 
FEB 1 ] )9--i 















City, Vt, ah 84114 
i (538-1135) 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY
 r STATE OF UTAH 
LEO DURANf : 
Petitioner, : ORDER OF DISMISSAL 
vs. : 
GERALD COOK, Warden, : Civil No. C87-6757 
Utah State Prison, 
: Judge Homer F. Wilkinson 
Respondents. : 
Respondent's notion to dismiss was heard on January 12, 
1988. Petitioner was present and represented by counsel, Gordon 
Strachan. Respondent appeared by and through Sandra L. Sjogren, 
Assistant Attorney General. Baving heard the arguments of the 
parties and being fully advised in the premises the court now 
•liters the following: 
QWZE 
Respondent's motion to dismiss is granted. 
DATED this day of _, 1988. 
BY THE COURT: 
HONORABLE HOMER F. WILKINSON 
District Judge 
APPROVED AS TO FORM: 
GORDON STRACHAN 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I hereby certify that on the '^  *"" day of February, 
1988, I caused to be nailed, postage prepaid, a true and exact 
copy of the above and foregoing Order of Dismissal to Gordon 




DAVID L WILKINSON (3472) 
Attorney General 
SANDRA L. SJOGREN (4411) 
Assistant Attorney General 
Attorneys for Respondent 
236 State Capitol 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114 
Telephone: (538-1021) 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
LEO DURAN, : 
Petitioner, : MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF 
MOTION TO DISMISS 
vs. : 
G. COOK, Warden, Utah State : 
Prison, 
: Civil No. C87-6757 
Respondent. Judge Wilkinson 
STATEMENT OF RELEVANT FACTS 
Petitioner pled guilty to second-degree felony burglary 
and third-degree felony theft in the Third District Court before 
the Honorable J. Dennis Frederick on June 8, 1987 in case no. 
CR87-699. Presently incarcerated in the Utah State Prison, 
petitioner seeks to invalidate his plea to the theft charge, 
claiming in effect that the plea was unintelligently aade since 
the thett charge was allegedly a lesser included offense of the 
burglary cnarge for which he could not be separately convicted. 
ARGUMENT 
Petitioner's claim that his plea was unintelligently 
entered appears, at first blush, to be appropriately brought 
under Rule 65B(i)(l) in a proceeding for post-conviction reliet. 
A review of the applicable provision in the code of criminal 
procedure indicates, however, that it is not. 
Utah Code Ann. S 77-13-6 (1982) states tnat a guilty 
plea may be withdrawn with good cause and leave ot court. There 
is no time limit for filing a motion to withdraw a guilty plea. 
Thererore# the proper procedure is for petitioner first to move 
to withdraw his guilty plea in the court in which it was entered. 
See State,¥*-GifcfceQS# 740 P.2d 1309 (Utah 1987). For the same 
reasons tnat the Supreme Court required the defendant in GibbQDS 
to file a motion to withdraw in the trial court before attacking 
the guilty plea on appeal, this Court should require petitioner 
to present his claim to the court in which he was convicted 
before seeking collateral relief. Indeed, if petitioner is 
unsuccessful on his motion to withdraw his plea, the appropriate 
avenue of review would be direct appeal to the Utah Supreme 
Court, not a Rule 65B(i)(l) petition. 
Secondly, even if petitioner were not required to 
return to the trial court and move to withdraw his plea, he 
failed to appeal from his guilty plea in the first instance. It 
it a long-standing rule that a post-conviction writ may not be 
a tad as a substitute for an appeal. 6odcetfS_*!*-B&tci8# 677 P.2d 
81, 86 (Utah 1983); CQdiaDDft.Y*-»fi£liS# 660 P.2d 1101, 1104 (Utah 
1983). Errors tnat were known or should have been known at the 
time ot appeal are, theretore, waived by a defendant's failure to 
appeal those errors. Id*. Clearly, petitioner knew or should 
have known that the two charges arose from a single criminal 
episode at the time he pled guilty. Thus, his claim is waived by 
bis failure to appeal from his conviction. 
CONCLUSION 
Based upon the foregoing, respondent requests this 
Court to dismiss the petition for lack of jurisdiction. 
DATED this &?L day of November, 1987. 





CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that on this j\r„_ day of November, 
1987 I caused to be mailed, postage prepaid, a true and exact 
copy ot the foregoing Motion to Dismiss and Memorandum in Support 
of Motion to Dismiss to Leo Duran, P.O. Box 250, Draper, Utah 
84020. 
IMLUK 
DAVID L WILKINSON (3472) 
Attorney General 
SANDRA L. SJOGREN (4411) 
Assistant Attorney General 
Attorneys for Respondent 
236 State Capitol 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114 
Telephone: (538-1u21) 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
DENNIS C. COFFEY, 
Petitioner, 
vs. 
GERALD COOK, et al., 
Respondent. 
FINDINGS OF FACT, 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW AND 
ORDER 
Civil No. C86-b305 
Judge Kenneth Rigtrup 
Respondent's Motion to Dismiss was heard on November 2, 
1987. Petitioner was present and represented himself. 
Respondent appeared through counsel, Kimberly K. Hornak, 
Assistant Attorney General. 
Petitioner attacked the validity of his guilty plea 
under Rule 11 of the Rules of Criminal Procedure and Rule 3.6 of 
tbt Rules of Practice in the Third District Court claiming that 
the plea was involuntary due to ineffective assistance of 
counsel* Respondent moved to dismiss the petition claiming that 
petitioner failed to raise his claim in the trial court by a 
motion to withdraw his guilty plea and that this Court, 
thereforef lacked jurisdiction over the subject matter. Having 
heard the arguments and being fully advised on the issuef the 
Court now makes the following: 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. Petitioner pled guilty to aggravated kidnapping and 
was sentenced to a minimum mandatory term of ten years and which 
may be for life on September 12, 1984 before Judge Rokich in the 
Third District Court. 
2. Petitioner is currently incarcerated at the Utah 
State Prison. 
3. Petitioner did not file a motion to withdraw his 
guilty plea before Judge Rokich. 
Based upon the foregoing, the Court now enters the 
following: 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
1* Statfi.¥A_GibbQDS# 740 P.2d 1309 (Utah 1987), holds 
that a defendant must move to withdraw his guilty plea in the 
trial court before he may challenge the validity of tnat plea on 
appeal• 
2. The holding of GibkfiQS applies equally to attacks 
on the validity of a guilty plea through writs of habeas corpus. 
Based upon the foregoing, the Court now enters the 
following: 
ORDER 
Petitioner is not properly before this Court on a 
collateral proceeding attacking his guilty plea because he must 
first move to withdraw his plea in the trial court. The petition 
for a writ of habeas corpus is, therefore, dismissed. 
DATED this day of , 1987. 
BY THE COURT: 
HON. KENNETH RIGTRUP 
District Court Judge 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that on this day of November, 
1987 I caused to be mailed, postage prepaid, a true and exact 
copy or the foregoing Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and 




IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
ROBERT BLAKE ZACCARIA, 
Petitioner, 
vs. 
GERALD L. COOK, WARDEN, UTAH 
STATE PRISON, et al., 
Respondents. 
MEMORANDUM DECISION 
CIVIL NO. C-87-5605 
The Court having reviewed the Memorandum submitted in 
support of respondents Motion to Dismiss, and petitioner's 
Memorandum in Opposition thereto, and being fully advised, now 
rules as follows: 
The Court is of the opinion that petitioner should proceed 
first in the sentencing court, by way of a Motion to Withdraw his 
guilty plea, and that therefore that matter is not properly 
before this Court. The other matters raised in petitioner's 
Petition are related directly to that issue. If the sentencing 
court grants the Motion to Withdraw the guilty plea, then all 
other matters in the Petition are moot. If the sentencing court 
denies petitioner's request to set aside the guilty plea, then 
petitioner may at that time make a determination as to whether he 
can appropriately challenge the revocation of his probation 
through a proceeding for post-conviction relief brought under 
ZACCARIA V. COOK PAGE TWO MEMORANDUM DECISION 
Rule 65B of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, as he has 
attempted to do here. 
Respondents' Motion to Dismiss is granted, and petitioner's 
Petition is hereby dismissed. 
Dated this _day of September, 1987. 
FRANK G. NOEL 
DISTRICT COURT JUDGE 
DAVID L. WILKINSON (3472) 
Attorney General 
SANDRA L. SJOGREN (4411) 
Assistant Attorney General 
Attorneys for Respondent 
236 State Capitol 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114 
Telephone: (533-7650) 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 




GERALD L. COOK, WARDEN OF THE : 
UTAH STATE PRISON, and the : 
ATTORNEY GENERAL OF UTAH, : 
: 
Respondents. : 
ORDER OF DISMISSAL 
Civil No. C87-5008 
Judge Pat Brian 
On December 4, 1987 the Court heard respondent's Motion 
to Dismiss and Petitioner's Motion for Stay of Proceedings. 
Petitioner was present, pro se. Respondent appeared through 
counsel, David B. Thompson, Assistant Attorney General. Having 
read the memoranda and heard arguments from both parties, the 
Court now enters the following 
ORDER 
Respondent's Motion to Dismiss is granted and the 
petition is dismissed without prejudice on the ground that 
petitioner is required to first move to withdraw his plea in the 
trial court* Once petitioner has moved to withdraw his plea, and 
appealed any adverse decision, he may then file a new petition in 
this Court. 
If/K 7 
DATED this ; ' ' day of J.C ^ , 1987. 
BY THE COURT: 
HONORABLE PAT BRIAN 
District Court Judge 
MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I hereby certify that on the day of December, 
1987, I caused to be mailed, postage prepaid, a true and exact 
copy of the above and foregoing Order to David R. Jolivet, P.O. 
Box 250, Draper, Utah 84020. 
DAVID L. WILKINSON (3472) 
Attorney General 
SANDRA L. SJOGREN (4411) 
Assistant Attorney General 
Attorneys for Respondent 
236 State Capitol 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114 
Telephone: (533-7650) 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
DAVID R. JOLIVET, 
Petitioner, 
vs. 
GERALD L. COOK, WARDEN OF THE 
UTAH STATE PRISON, and the 
ATTORNEY GENERAL OF UTAH, 
Respondents. 
ORDER STAYING PROCEEDINGS 
Civil No. C87-5008 
Judge Pat Brian 
On December 4, 1987 the Court heard respondent's Motion 
to Dismiss and Petitionees Motion for Stay of Proceedings. 
Petitioner was present, pro se. Respondent appeared through 
counsel, David B. Thompson, Assistant Attorney General. Having 
read the memoranda and heard arguments from both parties, the 
Cout now enters the following 
ORDER 
Petitioner is granted a stay of this case for two weeks 
from December 4, 1987 to permit him to file a motion to 
withdraw his guilty plea in the trial court. If at the end of 
two weeks, petitioner has not filed such a motion, the case will 
be dismissed. 
DATED this _i 1 day of V. >. A , 1987. 
BY THE COURT 
PAT BRIAN, District Judge 
MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I hereby certify that on the day of December, 
1987, I caused to be mailed, postage prepaid, a true and exact 
copy of the above and foregoing Order Staying Proceedings to 
David R. Jolivet, P.O. Box 250, Draper, Utah 84020. 
([tooLCat*. 
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